Collateral attack on a DMV adverse action order (suspension, revocation, denial, habitual offender status) would be justified only in two circumstances.

        Collateral attack could be maintained if the DMV adverse action order were void, rather than merely erroneous or voidable, because the department had lacked jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter. Estate of Bonfils v. Davis, 190 Colo. 70, 543 P.2d 701 (1976); McLeod v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia, 186 Colo. 234, 526 P.2d 1318 (1974); Davidson Chevrolet v. City and County of Denver, 138 Colo. 171, 330 P.2d 1116 (1958).
        The driver would be entitled to collaterally attack the revocation order had it been based on "a conviction obtained in violation of his / her constitutional rights". People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, ___, 589 P.2d 931, 933 (1979).

        When an administrative agency has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter in question, and when the agency is not proceeding contrary to the requirements of the state or federal constitution, the fact that the agency's order is erroneously or improvidently granted does not justify failure to obey the order. Where a driver does not challenge a DMV adverse action order against the driver's license until after arrest for driving under restraint, collateral attack on erroneous application of law to the facts will not be heard.  Drivers have the duty to comply with a DMV adverse action order until it is rescinded pursuant to a direct appeal rather than a collateral attack.  People v. Able, 200 Colo. 115, 618 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1980)

This may be a defense in a subsequent driving under restraint criminal charge as a collateral attack (DMV order void for lack of personal jurisdiction).  However that is questionable.  DMV has subject matter jurisdiction over license actions and personal jurisdiction is acquired when the notice of hearing is served.  There is no Colorado appellate caselaw on the issue of whether misidentification deprives the DMV of personal jurisdiction to proceed with adverse action.  If not argued at DMV hearing, use of an improper conviction may be considered a mere error in application of the law and denial of criminal case collateral attack.

Points not identified on traffic infraction penalty assessment

Municipal court default judgment - defendant failure to appear - traffic infraction penalty assessment.

Penalty assessment notice deficiency

This may be a defense in a subsequent driving under restraint criminal charge as a collateral attack - (inadequate notice reaches constitutional proportions)  However that is questionable - no Colorado cases have been decided whether PA notice deficiency may be used as a collateral attack in a subsequent driving under restraint criminal charge.  If not argued at DMV hearing, use of an improper conviction may be considered a mere error in application of the law and denial of criminal case collateral attack.

Summary - if you snooze, you lose

        Driving under restraint criminal charges carry mandatory jail and some are felonies carrying penitentiary time.  If you have a license problem and your driver's license is important to you, it's a plan to consult an attorney as quickly as possible.

        Defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prior conviction was invalid.  Once such a showing has been made, the People have the burden to establish that the conviction was constitutionally obtained.  People v. Hampton, 619 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1980), People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486, 617 P.2d 1178 (Colo. 1980), People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, 589 P.2d 931 (1979).

CRS 42-4-1702. Alcohol- or drug-related traffic offenses - collateral attack. 
        (1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1), no person against whom a judgment has been entered for a violation of section 42-4-1301 (1) or (2) shall collaterally attack the validity of that judgment unless such attack is commenced within six months after the date of entry of the judgment.
        (2) In recognition of the difficulties attending the litigation of stale claims and the potential for frustrating various statutory provisions directed at repeat offenders, former offenders, and habitual offenders, the only exceptions to the time limitations specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall be:
                (a) A case in which the court entering judgment did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the alleged infraction;
                (b) A case in which the court entering judgment did not have jurisdiction over the person of the violator;
                (c) Where the court hearing the collateral attack finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to seek relief within the applicable time period was caused by an adjudication of incompetence or by commitment of the violator to an institution for treatment as a mentally ill person; or
                (d) Where the court hearing the collateral attack finds that the failure to seek relief within the applicable time period was the result of circumstances amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.

CRS 42-4-1708. Traffic infractions - .... collateral attack. 
        (5)    (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (5), no person against whom a judgment has been entered for a traffic infraction as defined in section 42-4-1701 (3) (a) shall collaterally attack the validity of that judgment unless such attack is commenced within six months after the date of entry of the judgment.
                (b) In recognition of the difficulties attending the litigation of stale claims and the potential for frustrating various statutory provisions directed at repeat offenders, former offenders, and habitual offenders, the only exceptions to the time limitations specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (5) shall be:
                        (I) A case in which the court entering judgment did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the alleged infraction;
                        (II) A case in which the court entering judgment did not have jurisdiction over the person of the violator;
                        (III) Where the court hearing the collateral attack finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to seek relief within the applicable time period was caused by an adjudication of incompetence or by commitment of the violator to an institution for treatment as a mentally ill person; or
                        (IV) Where the court hearing the collateral attack finds that the failure to seek relief within the applicable time period was the result of circumstances amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.